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Abstract 
 
This article assesses the extent, nature and outcomes of the recently devolved health 
service governance in the four countries which comprise the United Kingdom. This four-
part configuration can be seen as a natural experiment in comparative governance which 
could therefore carry important lessons not only for the UK but in other countries too. 
While remaining under the aegis of the National Health Service, each constituent 
devolved administration has a developed a substantially different governance system. 
These systems reflect fundamental issues and priorities concerning the decentring of 
authority, the production and deployment of authority, the suite of incentives required 
and the preferred role of quasi-market mechanisms. The paper makes an evaluation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each governance regime. 
 
Introduction 
 
Health Services have been one of the main areas of social policy which have been 
devolved to the new country administrations within the United Kingdom. Hence, while 
the NHS remains a UK institution there are now some significant differences emerging in 
the way health services are governed and in the decision outcomes in these four 
countries. Thus, for example, while a notable feature of the NHS in England is the 
considerable admix of market-based and hierarchical approaches as seen in practice 
based commissioning in primary services and Foundation Trust and private sector 
providers in secondary care in England, Scotland has eschewed this approach. The 
purpose of this article is to undertake an assessment of the extent, nature and outcomes so 
far of devolved governance in these four countries. We see this four-part configuration as 
a natural experiment in comparative governance which could therefore carry important 
lessons not only for the UK but in other countries too. 
 
‘Governance’ in the context of health is currently both prominent and yet fluid and 
subject to multiple meanings. It carries multiple connotations including decision making 
authority, resource allocation, financial probity, regulation, oversight and so on. We see 
‘governance’ in the health context as a multi-form, multi-faceted and multi-level 
phenomenon.  
 
The multi-form element is recognisable in the variety of its manifestations – clinical 
governance, integrated governance, corporate governance, system-wide governance. Its 
multi-faceted aspect is recognisable in its usage for diverse purposes such as quality 
assurance, financial viability [etc]. Its multi-level nature is evident in the tiers of 
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governance from literal government of the NHS from the Department of Health and No 
10 from whence the overall architecture of the service is determined and certain priorities 
and directions are sent, through to the tiers of governance as witnessed by the Strategic 
Health Authorities in England, the devolved administrations of the other three countries, 
the governance regimes of acute trusts and primary care trusts and the cascade of 
governance within trusts down to the level of the governance of clinical practice.  
 
There have been observable trends in these various forms of governance in the NHS. 
Clinical governance has emerged with a focus on quality-assured risk assessment and a 
variety of intra-institutional measures designed to deliver safe health care to patients (for 
example Donaldson, 1998; Goodman, 1998; Nicholls et al., 2000; Scally and Donaldson, 
1998). Clinical governance has become the watchword for the delivery of institutional 
goals in terms of effective service delivery within hospitals. In a second, but related, 
development, focus has fallen on how the upper echelons of healthcare organisations 
control their respective institutions, define broader strategic objectives, and influence its 
behaviour. The concept of ‘corporate governance’ focuses on the activities of boards as 
they define strategic priorities for their organisation and adopt measure to influence 
behaviour within them (Ashburner, 2003; Clatworthy et al. 2000; Ferlie et al., 1995; 
Harrison, 1998). Taken together, clinical and corporate governance circumscribe the 
strategic deployment of resources within an organisation as they aim to deliver their 
services to achieve organisational aims and priorities. Typically, ‘clinical governance’ 
has attracted the attention of clinical practitioners and it focuses on the specificities of 
delivering safe and approved medical services. Crucially, it challenges the notion of the 
completely independent expert. ‘Corporate governance’ focuses on board composition 
and decision making procedures at the strategic level. Whilst this split represents a 
difference in emphasis on specific processes, these two forms share a conceptual space in 
the focus on the micro-processes of interaction through which healthcare organisations 
define and deliver their services. 
 
These two forms of governance (clinical and corporate) can also be seen as 
complemented by a third and much more wide-ranging form of governance. As deployed 
in political science and public administration, governance offers a wider purview on 
organisational practice (Kooiman, 1999; Ostrower and Stone, 2007). This broader 
perspective sees governance in terms of the multitude of institutions and the influence 
they exercise that constitute the context of an organisation’s behaviour. This concept, 
influenced by debates in the field of regulation theory adopts a macro perspective on 
organisational behaviour. It seeks to interpret the various ways in which the state 
distributes elements of regulatory authority and legitimacy to a diverse range of bodies 
(Black, 2002). This third sense of governance will constitute a central focus in our 
comparative analysis of governance regimes within the devolved NHS. 
 
The vast bulk of research on the changing forms of UK health policy and practice either 
implicitly or explicitly is concerned with the NHS in England, with little analysis of 
institutional variation between the devolved states. This is partly due to the historic 
presentation of the NHS as being an organisation located in the four home nations with 
only minor variation among them. At the policy level, the direction is seen to derive from 
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Westminster and be implemented throughout its territorial reach. There is some general 
agreement that organisations within the four home nations are marked more by similarity 
than difference. Accordingly, the nature and implications of devolution within the NHS 
has received little academic attention. Extant literature tends to focus either on the 
creation of health policy (Greer, 2001, 2004 a,b,c) or the outcomes (Jervis and Plowden, 
2003; Talbot et al., 2004) of the devolution of health policy and provision. This focus on 
the changes in policy or outcomes tends to underplay institutional re-organisation in 
general, and changes in governance in particular. Our paper addresses this gap in the 
literature by examining how these variations in governance regimes are played out in 
practice. This natural experiment allows some much-needed insight into the interplay 
between governance, incentives and performance outcomes.  
 
We shall point towards the fact that not only is there policy divergence but also the 
development of divergent governance regimes within the four nations. This divergence 
principally revolve around how the system is oriented to the market; the forms of 
regulation utilised; where the key sites of autonomy lie; the structuring of incentives in 
the system; the characterisation of the key actors; and, the prevailing modes and meaning 
of performance measurement. In conclusion, we shall argue that not only has devolution 
produced divergence in policy but also key divergence in governance regimes. These 
modes of divergence raise key differences about the meaning of a patient, the meaning of 
the expert and differing modes and practices of control.  
 
Whilst the discussion section of this paper draws out these features in detail, in 
anticipation of the conclusion there are certain summary generalisations or ‘tropes’ that 
capture the prevailing governance system within the each of the four nations. England is 
marked by ‘Decentering and entrepreneurship’, Scotland ‘Centralisation and autonomy’. 
Wales ‘Co-location and community’ and Northern Ireland by ‘Admixture and 
emergence’. In the following sections we look at each of the four systems in turn before 
making an overall comparative assessment. 
 
 
 
NHS England – ‘Decentering and entrepreneurship’ 
 
As the largest provider of healthcare services in the UK the English NHS attracts the 
greatest interest and greatest funding. It is tempting, therefore, that when producing 
comparative research on the NHS to use NHS England as a base point. The problem with 
such an approach is that it tends to position NHS England tacitly as some kind of static 
model from which the devolved states diverge. Whilst it is true that the governance 
structures of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were initially formed against the 
backdrop of legacy institutions, NHS England has also been marked by processes of 
innovation and re-structuring. Indeed, it could be said that NHS England has undergone, 
and is undergoing, a series of thoroughgoing reforms more extensive than any of the 
other three nations of the union. 
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Figure 1. NHS England (Basic Structure) 
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Figure 1 shows the basic, simplified, model of the macro-structures of NHS England. The 
British Parliament provides the legislative authority while with the remit for policy 
occurs within the Department for Health. England is subdivided into a series of Strategic 
Health Authorities whose remit is to act as the arm of the Department in the regions. The 
SHAs oversee the functioning and development of the full range of health services within 
their territories. Within each of these geographic areas a variety of organisations exist. 
The most direct linkage from the SHA is to its constituent group of Primary Care Trusts 
(PCTs). Their main role is to ‘commission’ (in simple terms i.e. define and purchase) 
health services. They also provide a certain number of primary care services themselves  
including dentistry, health visitors and within their geographical boundaries and they 
contract with general Practitioners.  Secondly, there exists a variety of NHS acute service 
‘providers’ within each SHA. Essentially these provide hospital services. In governance 
terms there are now two main types of these – the semi-independent Foundation Trusts, 
and the SHA-governed conventional trusts. The former are outside the SHA regulation 
but instead are overseen by a national body, Monitor (an independent regulatory body 
which wields considerable power).  
 
In addition, PCTs can, and do, commission secondary cares services from Independent 
Sector providers and from social enterprise providers. Encompassing the model are 
system-wide regulatory agencies (‘arms-length bodies’) that either use various strategies 
to monitor aspects of the performance of these bodies or offer system wide information. 
An example is the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) which offers 
guidelines on clinical practice and medicines. Thus, overall at the macro level, NHS 
England looks like the kind of classical top down model of governance with various 
geographical splits designed to achieve greater control through producing manageable 
Key: 
SHA- Strategic Health 
Authority 
PCT – Primary Care Trust 
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divisions of the undifferentiated geographical areas backed up by system wide 
monitoring. 
 
However, this general impression is tempered by the strategic deployment of a certain 
degrees of autonomy. In general, the idea of organisational autonomy has increased in 
currency throughout the system in recent times with emphasis on organisations 
‘competing’ within an internal market for finite commissioning resources. This 
increasing emphasis on autonomy and the assumed beneficial results of inter-
organisational competition has been matched by system-wide organisational monitoring, 
that de-centres command and control forms of governance to a series of alternate and less 
prescriptive regulatory strategies
1
 (Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Sinclair, 1997). This 
dialectic of autonomy versus de-centred control is reproduced throughout the system. The 
following discusses a number of key features that combine to characterise the prevailing 
governance milieu within NHS England. 
 
The key to generating an internal market is to differentiate buyers and sellers. This 
purchaser/provider split is achieved through the organisational segmentation with PCTs, 
acting as the key commissioning agents and the acute trusts offering a set of services to 
PCTs at a fixed price (Dixon, 2005). Unlike most capitalistic markets, prices do not 
signal intersections of demands and supply. The fixed tariffs system means that PCTs 
commission according to other criteria such as perception of quality, capacity, waiting 
lists, specialties and market variety.  
 
Despite the emphasis on local service provision, PCTs can commission services outside 
of their geographical areas - termed Out of Area Treatments (OAT). They can also 
commission private providers and, even more radically, commission services outside of 
the UK itself. PCTs have finite resources and can choose to ration care in particular 
sectors according to their strategic priorities. They are required to break-even on their 
budget and produce commissioning strategies based upon it. The PCT role has become 
more important due to the abolition of GP fund-holding. That system, first introduced by 
a Conservative government in the early 1990s, placed the commissioning role further 
down the system with individual primary care provider units (Klein, 2007). GP fund-
holding was considered politically sensitive and arguments abound that it was a failure 
and/or politically unacceptable (Klein, 2007). It was abolished by the incoming Blair 
government of 1997. Despite these issues, a new form of fund-holding has been re-
introduced under the rubric of Practice Based Commissioning (DoH, 2004 a, b). In its 
current phase participating GP practices are given indicative budgets, to which they 
should stick. They can re-invest any surpluses into the practice and any over-spends have 
to be clawed back in subsequent yeasts. The underpinning of this model is to make GPs 
as involved rational actors making use of the internal and external market to distribute 
resources efficiently. They become, in effect, commissioners of care for their patient 
group. This financial involvement of practices is supposed to produce efficiency gains 
through the internalisation of consequence at the individual practice level, with GPs 
                                                 
1
 If Power (1997) is correct about the audit society, then NHS England is the ne plus ultra of this urge to 
interrogate every aspect of organisational practice. 
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looking for viable alternatives rather than defaulting to acute care (for example, by 
carrying out minor procedures within their local practices or groups of practices). 
 
The porosity of the boundaries of NHS England to the private sector is, perhaps, one of 
the most radical reforms of the NHS. Whereas the other devolved nations treat the private 
sector as parallel and separate, NHS England seeks modes of interchange between these 
providers. Depending on the scale of this activity, it does seem conceivable that 
cumulatively it could alter the character of the NHS in a quite fundamental way.  
 
Acute care is organized into a number of ‘trusts’ which are governance and management 
arrangements for one or more local hospitals. Prior to the introduction of the Foundation 
Trust (FT) model, trusts were broadly under the control of the SHA, each with a system 
of corporate governance to manage its resources circumscribed by broad strategic 
planning requirements of the SHA. Upgrading from ‘ordinary’ to ‘Foundation’ Trusts 
status allows greater autonomy for these trusts and provides the basis for a degree of 
inter-trust market competition. FTs escape direction and control from the SHAs and 
become a relatively autonomous actors circumscribed by a set of legislative and service 
requirements.  In order to gain this status, NHS trusts have to produce business plans 
which are submitted to DH/Monitor for their approval. This autonomy theoretically 
allows FTs to distribute their resource in a much more business-focussed way. They are 
encouraged to behave entrepreneurially. Profits can be earned through improved 
operational efficiency and the elimination of waste, by increasing volumes of existing 
services and from the creation of new services. Initially, FT status was the preserve of 
only the higher performing trusts. However, current policy at DH level is that all NHS 
trusts should be in a position to apply for Foundation Trust status in the near future. 
Consequently, Foundation Trusts are to be the prevailing organisational form for acute 
care, generating sets of incentives for acute trusts to act as competitive actors. Growth 
through mergers and acquisitions are technically possible and a recent example was the 
merger of Good Hope NHS Trust into the Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust2 in 
2007). 
 
Associated with systems of public governance are the various modes of regulation 
designed to oversee performance. Contemporary analyses of regulation have interpreted 
it as a move away from command and control (Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Sinclair, 1997) 
and a ‘de-centring’ of the state (Black, 2002; Pattberg, 2006). Within NHS England there 
is move from direct control to a ‘Standards Driven System’ (DH, 2004c: 2), through 
which organisations are set a variety of standards in a number of domains. These 
standards include not only clinical standards but also corporate governance and financial 
targets. A variety of organisations monitors various targets and assesses their 
performance. The key bodies are the Healthcare Commission and Monitor but over 30 
such bodies operating in NHS England have been noted (Greer, 2004: 12). Table 1 shows 
four of the key ones and their areas of interest.  
 
 
                                                 
2
 http://www.healthcarecommission.org.uk/yourlocalhealthservices/nhsa-
zbyorganisationname.cfm/widCall1/customWidgets.content_view_1/cit_id/2202 
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Table 1 Illustrative selection of arm’s length bodies 
Organisation Domain 
HC Measure of performance on clinical outcomes and 
value for money 
Monitor Regulation of foundation trusts 
NAO Audits of financial performance 
NICE Guidance on public health, health technologies 
and clinical practice 
 
 
While the move away from direct command and control is evident, nonetheless, even 
under the new disclosure-based regulatory regime, these regulatory bodies retain the 
authority to intervene directly in the operation of a failing institutions. In the case of the 
Healthcare Commission, this is called being put under ‘Special Measures’. Equally, 
Monitor can step in and replace the Chief Executive and the senior team.  
 
Additionally, audits results are made public and comparisons through league tables are 
prevalent. The most notable is the Healthcare Commission’s use of Star Ratings, now 
termed the Annual Health Check which covers both clinical and financial performance. 
These reports are available in full and they detail the degree of conformance with the 
specified standards. Summary figures enable a direct comparison between similar 
organisations. This acts in two ways, firstly giving signal to consumers and secondly 
incentivising increased performance
3
. Not only is a failing institution likely to receive 
intervention, it may also suffer from reduced demand. The second governance strand is 
the increasing use of non-state bodies in the governance process. This can either take the 
form of private actors influencing behaviour (‘private governance’) or the explicit 
involvement of private actors with the state’s regulatory apparatus (‘co-regulation’) 
(Pattberg, 2006). In terms of the former, CHKS, a private organisation produces list of 
high performing acute trusts4 – whilst offering a consultancy service to improve 
performance via their own in-house regulatory assessment tools. In terms of latter, Dr 
Foster Intelligence, a PPP between Dr Foster Ltd and the Information Centre (the latter is 
part of the NHS), produces reams of information on both organisational and individual 
consultant performance. It produces two separate portals of information, one a suite of 
organisational information sold to trusts, the second a public portal enabling patients to 
compare ‘salient’ features of each consultant (including year of qualification and average 
waiting times). The processes by which these organisations influence the behaviours of 
trusts is more subtle than the direct interventionist potential of state institution, but 
evidence in other sectors suggest that they do have impacts particularly when an 
organisation chooses to pay from the products on offer (Pattberg, 2006). 
 
                                                 
3
 Some of these improvement may be ‘achieved’ through ‘gaming’ (Bevan and Hood, 2006) 
4 http://www.chks.co.uk/ 
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In his study of policy choices within the devolved NHS, Greer (2004 a,b)  sums up NHS 
England by the term ‘markets’. In this discussion we have sought to understand how this 
process affects governance. In NHS England we have seen a radical re-structuring that 
produces increasing autonomy at the bottom versus a diverse range of governance 
mechanisms in both quality of regulatory strategies and a de-centring of the state. As we 
will discuss, this route is one that other nations have diverged from in a significant 
degree, not only in questioning the market, but in the very quality and means of macro-
systems of governance themselves. NHS England is in fact a very circumscribed 
‘managed market’. It is subject to fixed prices through the national tariff system, the FTs 
cannot easily withdraw from the suite of services to which they have been committed and 
the commissioners (the PCTs) are behoved to operate in a way which is designed not to 
‘destabilise’ the system too extensively.   
 
 
NHS Scotland: ‘Centralisation and autonomy’ 
 
Scotland has adopted distinct health policies when compared to England. Its key policy 
documents Our National Health (SEHD, 2000),  Partnership for Care (SEHD, 2003) and 
its most recent major reform (NHS Reform (Scotland) Bill passed May 2004) has altered 
the nature of both its organisational structures and its interpretation of professional 
practice. It also has made significant attempts to distance and disconnect its institutions 
from those legacy institutions within the pre-devolved NHS. In broad terms, Scotland has 
adopted a policy based on institutional simplification, centralisation and bureaucratic de-
layering which acts, in part, as an enabler for effective professional practice.  
 
The basic structure of health service governance is shown in Figure 2. At the top of 
Scottish system lies the Scottish Parliament and its Health Department. In terms of 
service delivery there exist a number of Special Health Boards (including the Scottish 
Ambulance Service and a National Hospital5) and 14 NHS Boards that are charged with 
providing primary and acute care to their particular region (see Figure 3 map).  
 
These NHS Boards represent the most radical divergence for NHS Scotland. The change 
was initiated by a process of consolidating trusts since 1999, followed by their dissolution 
in 2004 (SEHD, 2003: 57). The explicit mission of the Boards to provide a unified 
service is made clear by the Scottish Executive: ‘The public, patients and staff expect the 
NHS at local level to be a single organisation with a common set of aims and values and 
clear line of accountability’ (SEHD, 2003: 57). This consolidation of primary care is 
designed to prevent explicit inter-organisation competition at the point of care within a 
particular geographic area. To this extent, the governance concept in structural terms 
could be said to be precisely the opposite of the diversified forms adopted in England. 
 
                                                 
5 The full list is: NHS 24, NHS Education for Scotland, NHS Health Scotland, NHS 
Quality Improvement Scotland, Scottish Ambulance Service, State Hospitals Board for 
Scotland, The National Waiting Times Centre Board 
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Figure 2. NHSScotland (Basic Structure) 
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Coterminous with NHS Boards is the development of the Community Health 
Partnerships (CHP). CHPs are not wholly independent from the NHS Boards but are a 
statutory part of their existence. As with all such attempts at community involvement, the 
degree of influence and representativeness is an open question. NHS Scotland also aims 
to achieve efficiency gains through uniting parallel bureaucratic organisations within a 
single site. Of course, this re-structuring alters the terrain of incentives covering the 
system. Whilst NHS England in particular strategically deploys autonomy and 
competition to widen the incentivisation for performance, the Scottish model represents a 
return to more centralised forms of control firmly within the Command and Control 
paradigm with power moving up the hierarchy. To use the language of game theory, the 
Scottish Executive are decision makers whilst NHS organisations are decision takers. 
Whilst such structures look like a return to centralised form of bureaucracy with their 
limited range of strategies and efficacy, such organisational re-structuring is designed to 
shift the locus of autonomy. Rather than locating autonomy at the level of the 
organisation, NHS Scotland shifts the balance to the practitioner, 
 
NHS Boards are themselves constructed with a focus on service delivery. They should 
practice delegation, not only in matters of clinical import, but also in terms of financial 
decision making, as a recent report by the NHS QIS stated ‘Operating division as integral 
parts of local NHS systems should have specific delegated authority to act within a 
defined remit without constant reference to the NHS Board’ (NHS QIS, 2005a: 4). While 
such notions may be the familiar stuff of policy statements there appears to be some 
evidence of movement in this direction in the shape of Managed Clinical Networks.  
 
Key: 
CHP – Community Health 
Partnership 
MCN – Managed Clinical 
Network 
NHS-QIS – NHS Quality 
Improvement Scotland 
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Figure 1: The 14 Health Board Regions in Scotland 
 
 
Managed clinical networks (MCNs) are, in essence, a formal group of specialists in a 
particular health area. Unlike the clinical networks within NHS England, who operate as 
loosely coupled practitioner communities, Managed Clinical Networks in Scotland exist 
as a central plank of policy. MCNs are ‘unconstrained by existing professional and 
Health Board boundaries’ (SEHD, 1999:2) – although a number of MCN are developed 
within a Health Board area. MCNs are seen as collections of altruistically motivated 
professionals, or ‘knights’ to use LeGrand’s (1997) nomenclature, working across 
boundaries who can utilise resources to achieve health gains within a specific field. There 
are a variety of MCNs ranging from Cleft Palates to Cancer. These MCNs are formally 
accredited by the state which takes a largely hands-off approach to their operation
6
 . 
  
The amended role of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) is an 
interesting one in Scotland. The decision to recommend or not-recommend a particular 
                                                 
6
 MCNs are accredited by NHS-QIS, however SEHD have recently announced that local MCNs are to be 
accredited by their respective LHB (SEHD, 2007).  
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treatment, particularly where there is a significant cost attached, can have significant 
resource implications for the rationing of healthcare. Wales and NI have retained this 
UK-wide body post-devolution. In contrast, Scotland has adopted a position of retaining 
NICE only in an ‘advisory’ capacity. It has no formal status and its advice is filtered 
through the Scottish institutions which can place provisos and riders on the advice. In 
some case this can lead to the adoption of diametrically opposed policy (c.f. Scottish 
Medicines Consortium).  
 
Performance monitoring 
 
The emphasis on the ‘knights’ (LeGrand, 1997, 2000, 2003; Welshman, 2007) of the 
profession extends into the assessment of performance. MCNs exist at the fringes of the 
formal performance monitoring system. While it may be difficult to assess the 
performance of an organisation that is not readily identified with an institution, the 
manner in which MCNs are substantially outside of the formal performance based 
management emphasizes the normative trust invested into the profession. Professionals 
within the NHS Scotland are incentivised to act as professionals; the declared aim is to 
‘enable’ them rather than control them. This is not to suggest that MCNs have no 
relationship to the state; they are required to submit a Quality Assurance programme as 
part of their accreditation and current advice from the SEHD suggest a move towards 
more formal performance monitoring and quantitative based measures (SEHD, 2007). 
 
NHS Quality Improvement Scotland (NHS- QIS) is the formal body charged with raising 
standards across NHS Scotland.  It acts as an umbrella for two organisations, the Scottish 
Medicines Consortium which acts as an advisor on treatment regimes (and also filters 
advice received from the England based NICE) and the Scottish Health Council, which 
carries out Annual Assessments. Given the emphasis on delegating authority from Local 
Health Boards to frontline practitioners, it is somewhat counter-intuitive to note the 
SHC’s Annual Assessments occur at the Board level. As (Farrar et al., 2004: 4) note, 
these Assessments cover a wide variety of clinical and organisational criteria, namely: 
 
1. Health improvement and reducing inequalities 
2. Fair access to health care services 
3. Clinical governance and effectiveness of health care 
4. Patients’ experience, including service quality 
5. Involving public and communities 
6. Staff governance 
7. Organisational and financial performance and efficiency 
 
At variance from the NHS England system the reports are framed more in developmental 
terms and do not provide readily comparative date. There is no equivalent of the Star 
Ratings or Annual Health Check. Thus, the Scottish assessments do not allow or provoke 
a comparison between units in order to inform patient choice – indeed, NHS-QIS state 
categorically in Clinical Indicators ‘Indicators do not constitute a ‘league table’ of 
performance’ (NHS-QIS, 2005b: v). Whilst is possible to generate comparison from 
some of quantitative data generated by NHS QIS, this data is separate from the detailed 
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reports on each LHB, is not easily accessible and would require secondary analysis to 
reached conclusions on comparative performance and improvements
7
 (Farrar et al, 2004: 
33). In keeping with the non-adversarial approach, this downplaying of quantitative 
measures re-emphasises the lack of incentive associated with these indicators. In contrast 
they operate as developmental reports, with indicators as indicative not comparative
8
. 
 
Health Boards have sometimes been criticised for insufficient delegation of authority 
throughout their region (e.g. NHS-QIS, 2005a :4). Similarly, the lack of attention to 
performance indicators is matched by virtually no assessment at all of MCNs. This 
dialectic of centralisation and delegation characterises the prevailing governance regime. 
What ostensibly appears to be a command and control system is underpinned by the 
actions of self-organising and self-regulating altruists
9
. Whilst it is not our intention here 
to seek to assess the system in toot, it is worth noting that Audit Scotland report that the 
system has experienced the problem of ‘producer capture’ with more resources being 
consumed through higher levels of staffing with limited impacts on performance (Audit 
Scotland 2004; Talbot et al 2004: 18-19). 
 
NHS Wales ‘Co-location and community’ 
 
Whilst NHS Scotland presents a significant restructuring of the pre-devolution NHS and 
a departure from the thrust of reform in England, the approach of Wales is more 
measured. Wales a opted to shift emphasis on certain policies and has designed simpler 
mechanisms and structures to those employed in England. There is also a greater 
retention of institutional ties with NHS England organisations. Taking an overview of 
NHS Wales (Figure 4) it looks somewhat similar to the NHS England mode. At the 
zenith lies the National Assembly for Wales with the Department of Health and Social 
Service (Wales) and a series of regional offices. This is followed by a number of Trusts 
delivering acute services and Local Health Boards (LHBs) acting as the commissioning 
bodies (essentially equivalent to Primary Care Trusts). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 There is some limited comparative data at the Board level concerning financial performance with the 
reports of Audit Scotland (2004, 2006a)  
8
 As NHS-QIS says of its Clinical Indicators: 
Used carefully and in the appropriate context, indicators can contribute to quality improvement 
within NHSScotland, by highlighting variations which can then be investigated and, where 
necessary, appropriate action taken. However, interpreting the indicators remains difficult. This is 
because apparent variation in an indicator may be due to a number of factors, which may or may 
not include the quality of care provided. It is important to re-emphasise that no conclusions should 
be drawn immediately, from any of the comparisons in this report, about the quality/effectiveness 
of the services provided for patients by different NHSScotland organisations or in different 
regions of the country. (NHS-QIS, 2004b: iv) 
9
 see Sinclair (1997) for a discussion of the ‘false dichotomy’ of Command and Control and Self-
Regulation. 
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Figure 4. NHS Wales (Basic Structure) 
  
Talbot et al. argues that the apparent institutional isomorphism with England is tempered 
by its focus on the local community (Talbot et al. 2004; see also Greer, 2004a). LHBs in 
the Welsh system are linked into community structures in a way that PCTs are not (or if 
they are, rather more at a symbolic level). In the first instance LHBs are geographically 
matched with local authorities, who are mandated to be included in discussions (the 
boundaries are shown on the map in Figure 5). Additionally each LHB consults with a 
Community Health Council (CHC) in order to emphasise the role of the local community 
in the healthcare system. Secondly, LHBs and their cognate Unitary Authority and LHC 
have a broader agenda encompassing a strong emphasis on public health. There is, at 
least, in Wales an attempt to move from a system that deals mostly with illness, to one 
that additionally and actively intervenes within its community to improve its general level 
of health (Greer, 2004a, Smith and Babbington, 2006). 
 
In retaining the purchaser / provider split between trusts and LHBs, NHS Wales retains 
some measure of the internal market and the imputed positive outcome imposed by the 
discipline of the market. However, this marketisation is muted to a certain degree by the 
agenda of localism (Talbot et al., 2004: 14). Trusts themselves possess more autonomy 
than in the English system due to the minimal of role of Regional Offices. Whilst SHAs 
have a strong steer on the operation of trusts (until they achieve foundation status), 
regional offices in Wales have few staff and resources, a limited remit and limited 
authority. The directive authority of the English SHA is largely absent in the Welsh 
Regional Offices. 
 
Key: 
DHSS (Wales) – Department of 
Health and Social Services 
(Wales) 
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Fig 5: Local Health Boards in Wales 
 
Performance  
 
Prior to 1
st
 April 2006, the Healthcare Commission (and the CHI prior to that date) took 
on the role of assessing the performance of NHS Wales trust and LHBs. After this date 
the Healthcare Inspectorate Wales (HIW), established 1
st
 April 2004, took over the key 
performance evaluation role. Whilst Scotland’s structures supplant the operation of 
English institutions, HIW is not a direct emulation of HCC but a divestment of one its 
key functions. NHS Wales retains a linkage to legacy institutions within NHS England 
with the HCC taking the following roles: 
 
• annual report 
• national (E & W) improvement services 
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• ensuring relevant 
• ensuring distinctiveness 
• reviewing quality of data 
(HC website, accessed 2007, get full version of this) 
 
Though restricted, HCC retains an unmediated role in its functions pertaining to NHS 
Wales, thereby providing key governance function in a ‘foreign’ system. However, the 
key elements which the organisation inspects, and which organisation sets the inspection 
agenda, are both retained in Wales (HIW and DHSS respectively). HIW operates a 
rolling series of inspections of Trusts and LHBs according to criteria set out in 
Healthcare Standards for Wales (Welsh Assembly Government, 2005) which covers four 
domains, namely: 
 
1. Patient experience 
2. Clinical outcomes 
3. Healthcare governance 
4. Public health 
 
Each of these domains contains a number of standards that are assessed and adjudged by 
the Inspectors. Reports by HIW are textual documents replete with recommendations and 
assessments and action plans. However, what the reports do not contain is any form of 
summative judgement either brief text or some forms of simple summary indicator of 
‘quality’ or ‘performance’. Hence, these reports do not allow easy comparison between 
organisations. This ethos is reproduced in the HIW website (www.hiw.org.uk) and 
reports eschew reference to comparisons explicitly or the presentation of data to enable 
simple secondary comparative judgement. As with Scotland, the emphasis of the 
inspection procedure is not about informing patient choice or constructing league tables 
but rather is about providing an improvement and developmental tool.  
 
This has obvious implications for the structuring of incentives. Whilst league tables 
within NHS England underline the competitive internal market, and the ideas such as 
‘money follows patient’ enshrines patients as active and informed consumers the lack of 
such an account problematises the operation of incentives within they system. NHS 
Wales trusts become suppliers to LHBs within the local health economy rather than 
businesses attracting individual consumers. This ethos of localism affects the deployment 
of incentives at anything other than an inter-organisational level. The fact that in 2000/01 
7 out 15 NHS Wales trust were in financial recovery (Audit Commission in Wales, 2002) 
perhaps suggest that incentives were failing. 
 
In summary, governance in NHS Wales represents a less radical departure from the 
English system than the thoroughgoing reconstruction in Scotland. However, NHS Wales 
does represent a divergence from the English system in a number of ways: an emphasis 
on the local community which is both policy directed and institutionally framed and a 
treatment of assessment as solely vehicles for organisational improvement. However, 
NHS Wales still maintains some links with NHS England, especially in (a) retaining a 
role for the HCC in key policy areas and (b) retaining, though not deploying, the internal 
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market in terms of the purchaser provider split. This particular blend of divergence and 
convergence produces a Welsh NHS that alters the emphasis and structure of incentives 
compared with NHS England, without re-building the system in a manner reminiscent of 
NHS Scotland. 
 
NHS Northern Ireland - ‘Admixture and emergence’ 
 
Any discussion of Health Policy, or policy per se, in Northern Ireland has to 
acknowledge that the policy process has been severely hampered by the prevailing 
political environment within Northern Ireland itself. The Northern Ireland Assembly has 
been suspended on a number of occasions and political discussion has been dominated by 
polarised opinions on Northern Ireland’s relationship to the UK mainland. This ‘inertia’ 
(Smith and Babbington, 2006) has lead to policy stagnation10, with piecemeal 
transformation which sometime lacks an obvious strategic direction. However, since 
2005, a major process of re-organisation, under the auspices of the Review of Public 
Administration (RPA), has produced and/or proposes a series of major changes in the 
system of governance within NHS Northern Ireland. Figure 6 identifies the macro 
structures of NHS NI in it’s position in early 2006, whereas figure 7 identifies the 
proposed changes to in 2007 onwards (where organisation have been stood down or new 
one implemented this is noted in the figure). As NHS NI is in the process of re-
organisation it is worth exhibiting these changes as part of the process. 
 
Figure 6. NHS Northern Ireland (Basic Structure) early 2006 
 
DHSSPS
NI Executive
LHSCG (stood
down 30 Sep 2006)
19 Health and
Social Services
Trusts
4 Area Boards
2006
GP Practices
 
 
                                                 
10
 As an example Northern Ireland did not abolish GP fundholding until 2002. 
Key: 
DHSSPS – Department of 
Health, Social Services and 
Public Safety 
LHSCG – Local Health and 
Social Care Group 
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Figure 7. NHS Northern Ireland (Basic Structure) 2007 onwards (proposed) 
 
 
 
 
DHSSPS
NI Executive
7 Local
Commissioning
Groups
5 Health and Social
Care Trusts
1 Strategic Health
and SSA (not yet
implemented)
2007
GP Practices
RQIA
 
 
With its policy making powers the NI Assembly is at the zenith of the structures. The 
Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS) is the relevant 
ministerial department responsible for healthcare provision. The territory is split into 4 
Area Boards (Eastern, Northern, Southern and Western), functionally equivalent to NHS 
England’s SHAs. Within each of these areas are a number of trusts which provide a wide 
range of health and social care services including acute care and community. Prior to 
April 2007 there were 19 such organisations, after this date these have been consolidated 
into just 5 trusts and renamed Health and Social Care Trusts. The Department of Health is 
in the process of amalgamating the four Area Boards into a single Strategic Health and 
Social Services Authority (SHSSA) covering the whole of NI. 
 
Commissioning has gone through substantial change in the NHS NI. Prior to September 
2006, commissioning was located in 15 Local Health and Social Care Groups who 
'purchase' services for their respective populace. When these LHSCGs were stood down 
in 30th September, the Area Boards assuming responsibility for both strategic direction 
and commissioning on an interim basis. The commissioning role is due to be assumed by 
seven Local Commissioning Groups (LCGs) in April 2008; whose spheres are co-
terminus with local government boundaries. This represents a hybrid system between the 
internal market in England, the focus on community in NHS Wales and the desire for 
simplification within NHS Scotland. As other commentators have noted, the NI system 
seems to be a blend of English, Scottish and Welsh systems (Greer, 2004a ; Smith and 
Babbington, 2006). On these two points, the manner in which they are implemented alters 
their meaning and implication; this blending itself (which is not discussed in terms of 
institutional emulation) produces a novel macro-system of governance. 
Key: 
DHSSPS – Departmnet of 
Health, Social Services and 
Public Safety 
SHSSA - Strategic Health and 
Social Services Authority 
RQIA – Regulation and Quality 
Improvement Authority 
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In terms of performance management, DHSSPS publishes Quality Standards based 
around five key themes. The performance of Boards and Trusts in respect of two of these 
themes ‘corporate leadership and accountability’ and ‘safe and effective care’ (RQIA, 
2007) is being carried out by the recently formed Regulation and Quality Improvement 
Authority (RQIA). RQIA analyzes each trust and board in situ and produces public 
reports. As with the Welsh and English systems, each major institution is inspected 
individually. However, in contrast to NHS England and in congruence with Scotland and 
Wales, these are solely developmental in nature and do not provide easy ways to compare 
information. However, in NI the principle of publicity and comparability is still deployed 
to a certain degree. The Health Minister sets explicit targets for waiting lists in particular 
areas (Woodward, 2005). The figures for each trust’s waiting lists in these are collected 
and collated by the DHSSPS and published in their website. In this way, DHSSPS retains 
an autonomy and flexibility to instantiate alternative regulatory strategies. 
 
In summary, NHS NI represents a governance system in the process of re-organisation. 
From the lens of Wales, England and Scotland it looks like NI is selecting elements of 
practice from each of these governance systems – local involvement, markets and 
centralisation – blending them together. The extent to which one can reach a judgement 
of incoherence is uncertain. Looking at an organisation in the process of development is 
unlikely to reveal clarity until it has a chance to work out its re-structuring and embed its 
practice. Rather than seeing NI as a governance system that is unclear, it may be fair to 
conclude that it is one that is in transition towards an alternative pathway which blends 
and balances the key elements of governance arrangements found throughout this article.  
 
Discussion 
 
Although macro-processes of governance can be used to deliver a variety of policy 
outcomes, it is unsurprising that policy makers adopt and adapt governance arrangements 
to distribute the range of incentives and authority to deliver the best outcomes. There is 
an elective affinity between policy and governance; indeed they frequently develop in 
tandem. Of course, governance, just as much as policy, is affected by its location within a 
particular societal and historical content, but this process is beyond the scope of this 
paper
11
. The aim of this discussion is to draw out the comparative governance regimes for 
NHS healthcare provision within the four devolved nations. In this section we will 
construct a heuristic typology to highlight the salient elements within the forms illustrated 
above. Salient features of the development of this model are detailed below. 
 
Governance / Structures 
 
In terms of governance/ structures we shall refer to the macro-structures organising the 
healthcare system. The most salient features are:  
 
                                                 
11
 For an in depth discussion of the policy process and key players within the devolved NHS see Greer, 
2006. 
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• Market Orientation. The way in which the system orients itself to the market, i.e. 
to what extent and how does the system make use of the market to distribute 
resources. 
• Regulation. Where key structures of authority lie, key in this point is the extent to 
which the state is de-centred from the determinative system of directive control to 
more diffuse ceding of power through the healthcare system 
• Site of decision autonomy. Governance systems tend to focus their interest on the 
function of a key actor (or actors) within a healthcare system 
 
Incentives 
 
Incentives refer to the basic determining conditions that provoke actors within the system 
to behave in a manner desired by the system designers. There are most often focussed on 
the site of autonomy within the healthcare system in order to provide the ‘carrot’ for 
desired forms of behaviour. 
 
• Key incentives. In broad terms the central incentives designed into the structures. 
• Characterisation of actors. The way in which those incentives imply and/or 
invoke the determining traits of these individuals/ organisations. 
 
Outcomes / Performance Monitoring 
 
Within any healthcare system, performance is monitored to a certain degree. In terms of 
looking at macro-structures of governance the key points are 
 
• Number of organisations involved in performance assessment. 
• Which organisations are the focus of assessment 
• Focus of measurement:  the meanings and deployment of these measures, i.e. how 
they operates in the wider milieu 
 
Taken together, these form the characterisation of the salient features of the healthcare 
governance systems within the devolved nation. The features are detailed in Table 2 
below.  
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Table 2. Summary of Governance Regimes 
 
Category 
 
Sub-category England Scotland Northern Ireland Wales 
Market 
orientation 
Entrenchment of the market 
(internal and external) 
 
Excision of market 
 
Non-deployed market  
 
Non-deployed market 
Regulation De-centred 
Some private governance and 
co-regulation 
 
Centralised 
‘Single system’ working 
Centralised Centralised 
Governance 
/ structures 
Site of autonomy Autonomy of ‘enterprises’ 
 
Autonomy of practitioners – 
the profession -  
Unclear  Autonomy of community 
Local health needs of 
community 
Key Incentive Entrepreneurship 
 
 
 
Enabling altruistic behaviour 
Enabling of professional 
practice 
Need to meet imposed targets Increasing Health of local 
community- enabling caritas 
Incentives 
Characterisation 
of actors 
Self-interested profit 
maximisers 
 
Vocational ‘knights’ Unclear Community-oriented altruists 
No. of agencies Multiple Agencies Single agency Single agency  
(Exception of target setting 
by DHSSPS) 
Single agency 
Focus of 
measures 
Focus on all organisations  
 
Focus on Boards Focus on acute trusts 
 
Focus on Trusts and LHBs 
Performance 
/ Outcomes 
Focus of 
measurement 
Developmental and 
Comparative 
 
Developmental Developmental  Developmental 
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In NHS England, there have been great strides in de-centring authority throughout the 
system, with various bodies being able to exert their authority within certain bounds. 
Each unit within the system receives various degrees of autonomy, with an emphasis on 
increasing autonomy further down the system. The current direction, e.g. the mandatory 
implementation of foundation trust status throughout the system and the introduction of 
practice based commissioning, continues to locate decision making and autonomy within 
organisations in which competition is most apparent, or at least where there can be a 
purposive relationship to healthcare market. Unlike other devolved systems, the market is 
treated as a beneficent bedfellow with both the internal, and to a certain degree external, 
market serving to structure the incentives throughout the system. Essentially, the market 
offers incentives for organisations to act entrepreneurially. Acute trusts can attract more 
patients, grow, acquire/ and/or merge with other trusts as any other business 
organisations. Similarly, GP practices under the practice based commissioning system 
can re-invest some of their savings on their budget (a corollary of profit in the system) 
into their practice. This centrality of the market affects performance monitoring and its 
deployment. In the first instance this is a withdrawal from command and control form of 
regulation to one based on an admixture of auditing and self-assessment – it points 
towards regulation through outcomes rather than synchronic regulation through process. 
Secondly, the information produces provides signals to the marketplace. As these 
outcomes are produced as public and explicitly comparative data – the concept of the 
rational consumer and the principle of money following the patient ensures that these 
outcomes signal consumer demand. This process has been furthered to instances of 
private governance and co-regulation in organisations like CHKS and Dr Foster. 
 
NHS Scotland present a radical divergence from this view. Authority is centralised, with 
its emphasis on ‘single system working’ and the purchaser / provider split is denuded into 
a series of regional boards organising and delivering healthcare within its region. Market 
principles are excised within the system with its shift to centralised decision making 
creating the space for the autonomy of practitioners. Whilst organisations are tightly 
regulated, professionals are understood as vocational ‘knights’ (LeGrand, 1997, 2000, 
2003). These ‘knights’ are incentivised as act as knights, more precisely they are enabled 
to act as rational altruists. In this manner performance outcomes become secondary in 
two key respects: (a.) they focus at the board level and part of the performance concerns 
devolving autonomy to practitioners and (b.) they are solely developmental in purpose. 
These outcomes form a reflexive backbone of organisational learning, not a signal to 
consumers of resources. In essence, governance in Scotland is an enabling system for key 
professionals with a strong steer retained at its zenith. 
 
NHS Wales’s key structural principle is the creation of coterminous institutions within 
the confines of a defined geographical area. Whilst the purchaser / provider split is 
retained, the structural principles do not use this opportunity to enact the market. The 
intended focus is the provision of care to the community and a general raising of its level 
of public health. In what seems like weak incentives there is a sense of deploying caritas 
(Weber, 1991: 300) within a group of community oriented altruists. The affectual 
investment in the community is designed to incentivise performance for the good of the 
community itself. External audits are developmental, on the basis of organisational 
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enhancement. The community structures the mode of governance and acts as the focus 
for both authority and autonomy. 
 
NHS Northern Ireland does exhibit some emphasis on community, however it fails to 
reveal a clear emphasis or governing principle qua governance. At the system level, this 
emergent system gives little clue of a defining quality. Indeed most apparent within this 
miasma is the lack of a defining emphasis on markets, community or simplification. In 
certain respect the system then becomes hierarchically driven with a single SHSSA at the 
broad strategic level, with other organisation becoming decisions takers lacking 
autonomy and becoming reactive to the precepts of those with authority. Similarly, the 
developmental outcomes measurement is overlaid by the autonomous actions of the 
DHSSPS to set targets for organisations and render them public. Northern Ireland 
presents a system of governance in the process of formation that, at the time of writing, 
seems to present a magma of governance, incentives and outcomes that fail to cohere. 
 
From this detailed picture we can derive summary characterisations of the four 
governance regimes within the devolved NHS (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 Governance systems in the four nations 
 
 Tropes Characteristics 
 
England Decentring and 
entrepreneurship 
A de-centred system characterized by the circumscribed 
autonomy of organisations, entrepreneurship and 
competition overlaid by a complex, multi-level de-centred 
system of monitoring and control. 
Scotland Centralisation and 
autonomy 
A centralised hierarchical model marked by simplified 
single system working enabling autonomous and co-
ordinated professional practice. 
Wales Co-location and 
community 
A system marked by geographically co-located 
organisations centred on the autonomy and practice of the 
community. 
Northern Ireland Admixture and 
emergence 
An admixture of community level commissioning, limited 
internal market and simplification within an emergent 
two-level system of performance monitoring. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Governance is increasingly seen as a key concept to analyse organisational behaviour and 
performance. At the micro-level, studies have sought to explore decision-making within 
institutions (Ashburner, 2002; Cornforth, 2002). In this paper, we have sought to broaden 
the horizon by exploring the broader macro-structures within the devolved system that 
constitute the macro-system(s) of governance within the devolved system of NHS in UK. 
Policy level analysts (Greer, 2001, 2004 a,b,c; Jervis and Plowden, 2003; Talbot et al., 
2004) have shown a systematic differentiation within the four systems. This paper has 
complemented and broadened these analyses by considering the emerging macro-
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structures of institutions of governance-structures, incentives and performance 
monitoring within England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. 
 
Each of these systems has the broadly similar goal of distributing finite resources to the 
benefit of the populace with is free at the point of use. What is apparent is that these four 
nations are adopting distinctive paths that diverge to a considerable degree. Each of them 
has its critics – for example, accusations of ‘gaming’ in England (Bevan and Hood, 
2006), ‘producer capture’ in Scotland (Talbot et al 2004: 18-19) ‘overspending’ in Wales 
(Audit Commission in Wales, 2002) and ‘excessive waiting lists’ in Northern Ireland 
(Dyer, 2005). However, each has a produced a substantially different governance system 
reflecting real differences in fundamental issues, concerning the decentring of authority, 
the production and deployment of authority, the suite of incentives required and the 
efficacy (or otherwise) of the market. It remains to be seen how these distinct systems 
play themselves out in the medium to longer terms, not only in macro-level measures of 
performance but also in terms of affecting the orientation of individual agents within the 
system. What remains clear is that the devolved nations are developing distinctive and 
divergent macro-systems of governance shaping the development of healthcare provision 
under the banner of a National Health Service. 
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